Related Books

Moral Hazard Effects in Health Insurance
Language: en
Pages: 14
Authors: Olesya Kazantseva
Categories: Political Science
Type: BOOK - Published: 2014-07-18 - Publisher: GRIN Verlag

Seminar paper from the year 2014 in the subject Business economics - Economic Policy, grade: 1,3, University of Kassel, language: English, abstract: Within the discussion about the increasing expenditures in health insurance, the overutilization of medical care is often attributed to the existence of a moral hazard problem. Since moral
Moral Hazard in Health Insurance
Language: en
Pages: 161
Authors: Amy Finkelstein
Categories: Medical
Type: BOOK - Published: 2014-12-02 - Publisher: Columbia University Press

Addressing the challenge of covering heath care expenses—while minimizing economic risks. Moral hazard—the tendency to change behavior when the cost of that behavior will be borne by others—is a particularly tricky question when considering health care. Kenneth J. Arrow’s seminal 1963 paper on this topic (included in this volume) was
Moral Hazard in Health Insurance
Language: en
Pages: 22
Authors: Carsten Berthram Andersen
Categories: Medical
Type: BOOK - Published: 2014 - Publisher:

Books about Moral Hazard in Health Insurance
Moral Hazard Effects in Health Insurance. An Empirical Perspective
Language: en
Pages: 20
Authors: Anke Höhmann
Categories: Business & Economics
Type: BOOK - Published: 2017-06-12 - Publisher: GRIN Verlag

Seminar paper from the year 2016 in the subject Business economics - Banking, Stock Exchanges, Insurance, Accounting, grade: 1,3, University of Kassel, language: English, abstract: In the discussion about cost increase for German health care, the existence of a moral hazard problem is often mentioned. A bigger part of the
Bonus Options in Health Insurance
Language: en
Pages: 143
Authors: Peter Zweifel
Categories: Business & Economics
Type: BOOK - Published: 2012-12-06 - Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media

Confronted with the continuing cost expansion in the health care sector, policy makers face a dilemma: limiting moral hazard in medical care requires that consumers participate in the cost, yet copayment is strongly resisted by today's socially insured. Thus, the experiences of three private German health insurers will be of